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BREATHING EASIER: EQUAL PROTECTION AND WORKERS'
COMPENSATION FOR COAL WORKERS' PNEUMOCONIOSIS IN
DURHAM v. PEABODY COAL COMPANY
MATTHEW C. COCANOUGHER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The coal industry finds itself in a unique position when dealing
with workers' compensation benefits. On one hand, it wants to adequately
compensate those who suffer from a disease caused by exposure to the very
mineral they extract. On the other hand, it needs to make sure that the
claims for benefits are only provided to those who actually develop the
disease. Coal Workers' Pneumoconiosis (hereinafter "CWP") is difficult to
diagnose. As a result, there have historically been problems with coal
miners drawing workers' compensation benefits for CWP when they "met
criteria for compensation only because they smoked cigarettes or had [a]
non-respiratory disability such as heart disease, hypertension or obesity."'
A 1980 study determined that out of 150 coal miners who were workers'
compensation claimants, "none had progressive massive fibrosis
(hereinafter "PMF"), the only true disabling form of coal workers'
pneumoconiosis."2 The study warned that we should "not try to delude
ourselves that coal mining leads to disabling respiratory impairment in the
absence of PMF."3
In Kentucky, which ranks third in the United States for coal
production,4 the legislature has been forced to frequently address the
aforementioned problems. Through numerous amendments to the relevant
statute, the Kentucky legislature has tried to balance the rights of the miners
against the rights of the state to compensate only those who meet the
criteria for the disease.5 This balancing act was reviewed by the Kentucky
Supreme Court in Durham v. Peabody Coal Co., which specifically
* Comments Editor, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, & NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW, 2010-2011. B.A. 2008, Centre College, J.D. expected May 2011, University of
Kentucky College of Law.
1 Lawrence Martin, Pitfalls in Diagnosis of Occupational Lung Disease for Purposes of
Compensation - One Physician's Perspective, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 49, 54 (1999) (citation omitted).
2 W. Keith C. Morgan, N. LeRoy Lapp & Douglas Seaton, Respiratory Disability in Coal
Miners, 243 JAMA 2401, 2403 (1980).
3 Id. at 2404.
4 Tim Huber, EPA Delays 79 Mine Permits: Agency Wants Fewer, Smaller Valley Fills,
Seeks More Monitoring, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Oct. 1, 2009, at I B, available at NEWSBANK
Record No. 2009274535.
5 See Department of Workers' Claims, http://www.labor.ky.gov/workersclaims/ (last visited
Jan. 26, 2010) [hereinafter, "Dep't of Claims'].
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addressed the constitutionality of a statutory provision that treated injured
coal miners differently than those injured in a traumatic accident for
workers' compensation purposes.6
Section II of this Comment will address the legal background of
workers' compensation law in Kentucky. In addition, section II will
discuss the procedure for bringing a workers' compensation claim and
provide a brief overview of CWP and its diagnosis. Section III will focus
on the case history of Durham. Section IV will analyze the court's
reasoning in Durham by focusing on the holding. Section V will address
potential impacts of Durham on the coal industry and coal miners as a
whole. Section VI will conclude this Comment.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
It is helpful to examine a few key concepts of Kentucky workers'
compensation law, especially as it relates to the coal industry, to fully
understand the context of the Durham case. Generally, workers'
compensation attempts to "restore an income stream to an injured worker to
the extent it has been severed by an industrial injury or occupational
disease.",
7
A. Workers' Compensation Law in Kentucky
Kentucky's workers' compensation program covers "approximately
80,000 employers and 1.7 million employees," with program costs around
$1.5 billion per year.8 It has gone through many changes in recent
decades, particularly because of issues faced by the coal industry.
In 1996, the "premiums in the coal industry had risen 89 percent in
the preceding two years." 9 Not only was the coal industry dealing with
these higher premiums, but "the number of workers receiving awards in the
previous seven years had more than doubled, despite no evidence of [an]
increase in on-the-job injuries."'10 In response to these costly problems, the
Kentucky legislature enacted wide scale reforms in December 1996."
These reforms focused on continuing to protect injured employees while
lessening the financial burden on employers.' 2
The workers' compensation laws were revised again in 2000,
reinstating the Workers' Compensation Board as the first appellate avenue
6 Durham v. Peabody Coal Co., 272 S.W.3d 192 (Ky. 2008).
7 Dep't of Claims, supra note 5.
Sld.
9 Id.
10 1d.
1Id.
'
21d.
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before taking a claim to the Court of Appeals.' 3 Finally, the laws were
amended in 2002 by "providing that coal miners who leave the coal mining
industry and are determined to suffer from the occupational disease of coal
worker's pneumoconiosis (black lung) should have an opportunity to make
[a] transition to other employment by education and retraining programs."' 4
It is this procedure set forth in the 2002 revision that was constitutionally
challenged by the coal miners in Durham v. Peabody Coal Co.."
B. Workers' Compensation Procedure
Kentucky Revised Statutes (hereinafter "KRS") Chapter 342 covers
workers' compensation law.' 6 The chief function of this chapter is "to
provide timely medical services for the cure or relief of the injury; and to
provide rehabilitation and retraining services to injured workers unable to
return to their former jobs."'7 The specific statute at issue in this case is
KRS 342.316, which establishes the procedure for a coal miner filing for
workers' compensation benefits because of CWP.'
8
C. Coal Workers' Pneumoconiosis
The Center for Disease Control (hereinafter, "CDC") defines CWP
as "a lung disease caused by inhaling coal mine dust."'19 Alarmingly,
"according to recent studies by the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (hereinafter, "NIOSH"), about one of every 20 miners
participating in our program has X-ray evidence of
some pneumoconiosis. 2 °
The disease varies in severity; for example, "[iun its early
stages,... the disease may not prevent you from working or carrying on
most normal activities.",2' However, if "the disease progresses from simple
to complicated pneumoconiosis, a condition also called progressive massive
fibrosis [exists]."22  The CDC also notes that "there is no cure for the
damage that the dust has already done to your lungs. 23
13 Dep't of Claims, supra note 5.
'
4
1d.
" Durham, 272 S.W.3d at 194.
16 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation).
17 Dep't of Claims, supra note 5.
IS KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.316 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation).
19 NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL, COAL WORKERS' X-RAY SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS &
RESOURCE LIST (NIOSH Pub. No. 2002-122) (2002), http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2002-122.
20 id.
21 Id.
22 id.
23 Id.
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To determine which category of CWP is present, it is important to
understand the effect that coal dust has on miners. As pointed out by the
United States Occupational Health and Safety Organization, "[c]oal dust
causes pneumoconiosis, bronchitis and emphysema in exposed workers. 24
Medically, "[s]imple CWP is characterized by development of coal
macules, a focal collection of coal dust particles with a little reticulin and
collagen accumulation., 25  This forms lesions which "may be visible as
small opacities (less than 1 cm in diameter) on X-rays. 26 When a medical
professional examines the X-rays, "[t]he profusion of small opacities is
classified into four major categories (0, 1, 2, or 3), with subdivisions
reflecting variation within the major category; category 1/0 or higher is
considered radiographic evidence of pneumoconiosis."
2 7
III. CASE HISTORY
Durham v. Peabody Coal Co. is a consolidated case of coal miners
who worked in coal mines for 30 to 35 years each.28 Each miner claimed to
suffer from Category 1 CWP. 29  Accordingly, each applied for workers'
compensation benefits under KRS 342.316, which governs the procedure
for determining workers' compensation benefits for CWP.30  Both the
workers and their employers submitted X-rays as evidence of whether CWP
existed.3 t  The workers' experts concluded that the miners had either
Category 1/0, 1/1, or 1/2 CWP. 32  The employers' experts reported
Category 0/0, a complete absence of the disease, for all of the miners.33
Where an employer's expert evidence conflicts with a worker's
expert evidence and one of the readings is low enough to deny the claimant
benefits while the other is high enough to grant benefits, KRS
342.316(3)(b)4.e is used and a panel of three NIOSH certified "B" readers34
24 Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational
Safety and Health Guideline for Coal Dust (less than 5 percent SiO2),
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/healthguidelines/coaldust-less5percentsio2/recognition.html (last visited,
Jan. 28, 2010).
25 Id.
26 id.
27 M.D. Attfield & E.L. Petsonk, Advanced Pneumoconiosis Among Working Underground
Coal Miners - Eastern Kentucky and Southwestern Virginia, 2006, 56 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WKLY REP. 652, 653 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5626.pdf.
28 See Durham, 272 S.W.3d at 194.
29 id.
30 id.
31 Id.
32 id.
33/d.
34 "A "B" reader is a physician (not necessarily a radiologist) who has taken a course on
reading pneumoconiosis chest X-rays according to the standards to the International Labor Organization
(hereinafter, "ILO"), and passed a timed X-ray interpretation test." Martin, supra note 1, at 59.
[Vol. 2 No. 2
BREATHING EASIER
determine the amount of the disease actually present.3' However, in
situations where both initial readings from the employer and employee are
high enough for the employee to receive benefits, but there is a disparity
with the expert's determination of the category of disease, the Kentucky
Supreme Court recently held that using the KRS 342.316(b)4.e process of
the "B" readers is unconstitutional.36 This decision was limited to a
discrepancy in readings when both parties agree there is evidence of CWP
and does not restrict the "B" readers process when the initial readings of the
X-rays by the experts show either a presence of CWP or a total absence of
CWP.
37
In Durham, the panel of "B" readers agreed that each of the coal
miner's X-ray evidence produced a 0/0 or negative reading.38 After a
decision by the panel, KRS 342.316(13) states in part that "[t]he consensus
classification shall be presumed to be the correct classification of the
employee's condition unless overcome by clear and convincing evidence. 39
Thus, a worker may rebut the panel's consensus with clear and convincing
evidence. This is the provision which was constitutionally challenged by
the miners.
Instead of trying to rebut the "B" readers' findings, the coal miners
brought this action and argued that "KRS 342.316 discriminates unlawfully
between workers who are injured by a harmful occupational exposure to
coal dust and those who become physically disabled by a traumatic
injury."4 The miners also argued that the statute denied them equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution because it requires them to "submit clear and convincing
evidence.. ., [the toughest standard to meet in civil litigation,] while other
workers [could] prove an injury with only a preponderance of the
evidence."41 They further contended that KRS 342.316 limits them to X-
ray evidence and strips the administrative law judge (hereinafter, "AL")
"of the discretion to consider a worker's credible testimony regarding
breathing difficulties" and the type and amount of exposure to coal dust.42
" Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.316(3)(b)4.e (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation).36 Cain v. Lodestar Energy, Inc., 302 S.W.3d 39,43 (Ky. 2009).
3 7 
id.
31 Durham, 272 S.W.3d at 194.
'9 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.316(13) (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation).
40 Durham, 272 S.W.3d at 194.
41 Id. at 194-95.42Id. at 195.
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IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. The Holding
The Kentucky Supreme Court ultimately held that "inherent
differences between coal workers' pneumoconiosis and traumatic injuries
provide a reasonable basis or substantial and justifiable reason for different
statutory treatment. 43 The court reached this decision after determining
that while CWP can develop into a disabling disease, the state has a
legitimate interest in treating CWP differently than traumatic injuries
suffered on the job.44 After explaining that the miners failed to bring a
more comprehensive argument that would have included a comparison to
workers with traumatic injuries and "other occupational pneumoconioses or
diseases,"45 the court stated that in a workers' compensation setting "all
claimants bear the burden of proof and the risk of nonpersuasion before the
ALJ."46 It reasoned that KRS 342.316 explicitly states that if a claimant's
evidence is challenged by sufficiently persuasive evidence, that claimant
must then produce more convincing evidence for rebuttal or their claim will
be unsuccessful.47 Furthermore, the court found that "[w]hen met with
evidence more convincing than his own, a claimant's burden on rebuttal is
even higher." 48 The court concluded its analysis by reasoning that the types
of evidence used for traumatic injuries will have to vary with the type of
injury, but evidence for CWP is proved with X-ray evidence; therefore,
there was "a reasonable basis for treating the conditions differently. '49
i. State's Interest in Treating Workers with CWP Differently
The court began its analysis by stating that the Fourteenth
Amendment "requires persons who are similarly situated to be treated
alike. 50 It recited the general proposition that statutes "concerning social
or economic matters generally comply with federal equal protection
requirements if the classifications that they create are rationally related to a
43 Id.
44 See id.
451 Id. at 194 n.2.
46 Durham, 272 S.W.3d at 196 (citing Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1984); Snawder v. Stice, 576 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. Ct App. 1979); Young v. Burgett, 483 S.W.2d
450 (Ky. 1972); Roark v. Alva Coal Corp., 371 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1963)).
41Id. at 196.4
9 id.
49 Id. at 198.
5 0 d. at 195.
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legitimate state interest."5' The court also noted that its "[a]nalysis begins
with the presumption that the legislative acts are constitutional.,
52
The court then addressed the state's interest in upholding the
current procedure for determining benefits for CWP claims by describing
the history of amendments to KRS 342.316. It found that "in 1987,
legislators relied on testimony from medical experts that coal workers who
suffer from pneumoconiosis should be encouraged to find other
employment but that even category 3 simple pneumoconiosis is not usually
associated with any significant decrease in lung function. 53  The court
noted that these reforms were an "attempt to control the cost of coal
workers' pneumoconiosis claims, particularly by workers with no
significant respiratory impairment."
5 4
The court found further support for the state's interest in treating
these groups differently by pointing out the distinguishing factors between
traumatic injuries and CWP. 55 It observed that traumatic injuries, unlike
CWP, take place suddenly and are easier to differentiate from one another.
56
ii. KRS 342.316 Does Not Deny Equal Protection
The court began its equal protection analysis by acknowledging
that KRS 342.316(13), which imposes a clear and convincing evidence
standard to overcome the "B" readers consensus, may appear
discriminatory.57 However, it then reasoned that while KRS 342.316(13)
may appear unfair, the coal miner must go through the same process as any
other worker attempting to file a successful workers' compensation claim.
5Y
Since the "B" readers' procedure was the one at issue, the court
next focused on the merits of this evidentiary requirement.59 It held that
"although the claimants offered substantial evidence in the form of an x-ray
interpretation of category 1 pneumoconiosis, their employers met that
evidence with equally persuasive substantial evidence to the contrary."
60
The unbiased "B" readers are to be used in this type of situation to help
determine the miner's actual health condition.6' Even, as in this case, when
s1 Id. (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,439,440 (1985)).
52 Durham, 272 S.W.3d at 195 (citing United Dry Forces v. Lewis, 619 S.W.2d 489 (Ky.
1981); Sims v. Bd. of Educ., 290 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1956); Brooks v. Island Creek Coal Co., 678 S.W.2d
791 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984)).
53 Id. (citing Ky. Harlan Coal Co. v. Holmes, 872 S.W.2d 446 (Ky. 1994)).
Id. at 196.
" See id.
56 id.
57 id.
58 Durham, 272 S.W.3d at 196.
59 Id.
6 Id.
61 Id.
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the three "B" readers consensus is against the X-ray evidence presented by
the claimants, there is still a possibility of recovery for the claimant, as
"KRS 342.316(13) provides a rebuttable presumption that a consensus of
the three "B" readers is correct but allows the presumption to be overcome
with clear and convincing evidence., 62 The court, therefore, considered this
a reasonable procedure that did not violate equal protection.
iii. Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard on Rebuttal
The court cited Fitch v. Burns, which defined the clear and
convincing evidence standard as "'evidence substantially more persuasive
than a preponderance of the evidence, but not beyond a reasonable
doubt."3 In Durham, the court held that to overcome a consensus of the
"B" readers, "[o]nly overwhelming evidence would reasonably overcome
such evidence.'6 4
In Hunter Excavating v. Bartrum, the court addressed this point
more fully, finding that the "Department [of Workers' Claims] has a
reasonable basis for limiting any party to evidence that is relevant and not
merely cumulative.6 5 The court, in Durham, held that "KRS 342.316 does
not make it impossible to rebut the panel's consensus by restricting the
evidence that may be submitted;" the court, therefore, upheld the clear and
convincing evidence standard needed to rebut the "B" reader consensus.66
iv. Sufficiency of X-ray Evidence
When determining the sufficiency of X-ray evidence, it is helpful to
look at the definitions contained in the workers' compensation statute. The
court found that the relevant portion, KRS 342.0011(1), "requires a work-
related harmful change in the human organism to be evidenced by
'objective medical findings' and states that when used generally, the term
'injury' includes occupational diseases.' 67  Therefore, anyone seeking
workers' compensation benefits "must prove the existence of the work-
related harmful changes with information that a physician gains through
direct observation and/or testing that utilizes objective or standardized
methods. ''68 For coal miners, the "X-ray is the objective method by which
62 id.
63 Id. at 196-97 (quoting Fitch v. Bums, 782 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Ky. 1989)).
6Durham, 272 S.W.3d at 197.
65 Id. (citing Hunter Excavating v. Bartrum, 168 S.W.3d 381, 385 (Ky. 2005)).
6id.
67 Id. (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.0011(1) (West, Westlaw through 2009
legislation)).
Id (citing Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.0011(33) (West, Westlaw through 2009
legislation); Gibbs v. Premier Scale Co./Indiana Scale Co., 50 S.W.3d 754 (Ky. 2001)).
[Vol. 2 No. 2
BREATHING EASIER
physicians diagnose the presence of pneumoconiosis and categorize its
severity., 69 While the court agreed that a worker's testimony about his
length of exposure to coal dust can aid a physician in determining the
"cause of pneumoconiosis," it held that this type of testimony fails as
"objective medical findings regarding the presence of the disease or the
disease category. 70
The court next addressed the Kentucky Administrative Regulations
(hereinafter, "KAR") which apply to KRS 342.316. It cited Hunter
Excavating, which determined that the version of 803 KAR 25:009 in effect
at the time violated due process because it prohibited a rebutting party from
providing additional reports of the X-rays in evidence. 71 This regulation
was amended after the court in Hunter Excavating found it unconstitutional
and the current form of 803 KAR 25:009, section 3(1) "allows a party
seeking to rebut a panel's consensus to submit an additional interpretation
of one of the x-rays in evidence, 72 and 803 KAR 25:009, section 4(5)
provides the ALJ with the authority to "allow timely cross-examination of a
medical evaluator that participated in the consensus process at the expense
of the moving party. 73
The court concluded its reasoning concerning the state's legitimate
interest in treating the procedures for workers with CWP differently by
stating the evidence needed to prove CWP is "proven with x-ray evidence,"
while the evidence for a traumatic injury can vary with the type of injury.74
It held that this "difference provides a reasonable basis for treating
conditions differently."75 These findings allowed the court to ultimately
hold that X-ray evidence is the medically objective way to determine
whether CWP exists but that additional X-ray evidence could be submitted
to the panel.76
v. Dissent
The dissent in this case, written by Justice Scott, stated that "[y]ou
simply can not, in these circumstances, fairly impose a more stringent,
higher standard on one and not the other," referring to CWP as opposed to
workers with traumatic injuries.77  Thus, the dissent found that the
"statutory scheme of KRS 342.316 ... violates the Equal Protection clause
69 Id.
70 
Durham, 272 S.W.3d at 197.
71 Id. (citing Hunter Excavating, 168 S.W.3d at 385).
" Id. at 198.
73 803 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 23:009 § 4(5) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2009).74 Durham, 272 S.W.3d at 198.
75 Id.
76 See id.
77 id.
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of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions and is therefore
unconstitutional. 78
V. IMPLICATIONS
The Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Durham approved the
Kentucky legislature's most recent amendment to KRS 342.316 .79 The
majority's decision made clear that it believes this legislation is continuing
to serve its purpose of separating valid claims from invalid claims and
compensating those workers who are determined to be truly injured.80 This
decision also raises issues involving attorney costs, how to select the correct
medical expert, and how to make the best comparison for an equal
protection argument.
First, this decision could impose additional costs on attorneys
representing Kentucky coal miners. As X-ray evidence is the only evidence
which may actually be used to prove CWP, attorneys for coal miners
bringing a workers' compensation claim will be forced to go through the
expense of hiring a medical expert to interpret their client's X-rays before
they know whether or not they have potentially successful claims. If the
miner is complaining of the symptoms of CWP but it turns out that the X-
rays do not show a sufficient presence of the disease, the attorney will then
be faced with the decision of whether to get an additional expert opinion or
abandon the claim. This could discourage attorneys from accepting
workers' compensation claims for miners with CWP from the outset.
On the other hand, attorneys representing Kentucky coal companies
should also use this decision to prepare for employees' workers'
compensation claims. While it may be costly for a coal company to take
multiple X-rays for each employee's claim, this may be a necessary step to
rebut the "B" readers. As evidenced by Durham, having the ability to rebut
the X-rays is a vital step in challenging a miner's claim. The more X-rays
and expert interpretations the coal companies have, the greater the chances
of successfully separating the valid claims from the invalid claims. As the
coal companies are paying the premiums for workers' compensation
insurance and losing long-time employees to CWP, they have a strong
interest in ensuring that their workers are compensated according to the
presence and severity of their disease.
7 id.
79 See id.
go See id
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Furthermore, attorneys for both sides need to be wise in choosing
medical experts to examine the X-rays. Dr. Lawrence Martin8' warns that
while the "vast majority of physicians rely on independent radiologists to
take and interpret chest X-rays on their patients.... [S]ome non-radiology
trained physicians operate X-ray machines in their offices and then formally
interpret the claimant's chest X-ray. '8 2 Martin warns that "this practice can
lead to over-interpretation," which could affect whether the claim is
accepted or rejected.8 3 As a result, it could be to an attorney's advantage to
hire someone certified as a "B" reader to interpret the X-rays. This would
allow the attorney to get a hypothetical indication of what the panel will
decide if the matter progresses to that stage. It must also be considered, as
evidenced by Durham, that choosing the wrong expert could give a
claimant false hope of a successful claim, only to be trumped by the "B"
readers.
Finally, Durham could shape future equal protection arguments for
workers' compensation claimants. The recent holding in Cain shows that
the armor of KRS 342.316 may be pierced, as the court found the "B"
reader procedure outlined in KRS 342.316(3)(b)4.e was unconstitutional
when a worker with two initial X-rays that, while conflicting, still contained
high enough readings to grant benefits.84 However, the Cain decision also
enhanced the rationale of Durham by citing to that decision for the
proposition that the consensus process of the "B" readers does not deny
equal protection to "all coal workers who raise pneumoconiosis claims."8 5
Read together, Durham and Cain may show that the Kentucky Supreme
Court remains undecided regarding the constitutionality of KRS 342.316.
As the Durham court noted, the Equal Protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is designed so that "persons who are similarly
situated" are treated alike. 6 A problem for the coal miners in Durham was
that they did not compare their procedure with that of similarly situated
workers. In response to the plaintiffs' choice to compare the procedure for
CWP with that of traumatic injuries, the court stated in footnote two that
"[t]he workers failed to raise . . . their present, more comprehensive
argument," 87 which would have compared the procedure for coal miners
with CWP to that of workers with "other occupational pneumoconioses or
diseases. 88 In addressing this failure on the part of the plaintiffs, the court
a' Lawrence Martin served as the Chief in the Division of Pulmonary and Critical Care
Medicine at Mt. Sinai Medical Center in Cleveland as well as an Associate Professor of Medicine at
Case Western Reserve School of Medicine. Martin, supra note 1, at 49 n.l.
82 Martin, supra note 1, at 58.8
3 id.
84 Lodestar Energy, Inc., 302 S.W.3d at 43.
85 Id. at 42 (citing Durham, 272 S.W.3d 192 (Ky. 2008)).
16 Durham, 272 S.W.3d at 195.
8' Id. 194 n.2.
88 Id.
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opened the door to the idea that the result may have been different had it
been able to hear this more comprehensive argument. Thus, for potential
claimants contemplating an equal protection claim, this footnote suggests
that they must consider the importance of the "similarly situated"
requirement when bringing an action.8 9 It is not enough to focus on the
requirements of the procedure that are being challenged; rather, in bringing
a Fourteenth Amendment claim, one must make the correct comparison
with a procedure affecting workers with a similar plight. As shown in
Durham, the failure to make the right comparison can be the difference
between a successful and an unsuccessful claim.
VI. CONCLUSION
Determining workers' compensation benefits for those suffering
from CWP has long been a difficult task. After numerous revisions to
Kentucky statutes arising from problems with escalating premiums and
extra benefits being awarded without an increase in those suffering from
CWP, the Kentucky Supreme Court seems comfortable with many of the
procedures currently set out in KRS 342.316, as evidenced by the holding
in Durham. Therefore, attorneys representing parties from the coal industry
should use Durham to better prepare for defending workers' compensation
claims for CWP, and attorneys representing workers should use this case to
ensure qualified medical experts read the X-rays. While the Kentucky
legislature may be able to breathe easier for the moment, it should not hold
its breath. As X-ray evidence of CWP could become costly for attorneys
and a winning equal protection argument has already prevailed in Cain, it
will be interesting to see whether another equal protection argument would
lead the Kentucky Supreme Court to find the entire statute unconstitutional,
in which case the Kentucky legislature may once again find itself forced to
amend KRS 342.316.
9 Id. at 195.
[Vol. 2 No. 2
